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divendres, 2 / desembre / 2005 |
Els d'Apple també, de vegades, mostren un missatges d'error dignes de menció:
No tinc ni idea, ni ho vull saber, que és això del 'bad public movie atom'... jo només intento mirar el trailer a la web d'Apple.
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14:32 (# Enllaç permanent) | Comentaris: | Trackback:
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[NetworkWorld] Google's Gmail gains virus scanning capabilities. Fins ara GMail bloquejava els fitxers associats d'una determinada extensió... ara, a més, inclou un antivirus que automàticament analitza els missatges.
Gmail will automatically scan all attachments users send and receive, according to a frequently asked questions section devoted specifically to this new functionality.
Gmail will attempt to clean or remove viruses from infected attachments so that users can access the attachment's information; otherwise, users will not be able to download the attachment. Gmail will also prevent users from sending messages with infected attachments.
Until now, Google has protected Gmail users by blocking messages that carry attachments commonly associated with virus attacks.
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 Nagios és un software de monitorització del funcionament de les xarxes, de codi obert. Permet la monitorització del funcionament de serveis, recursos (CPU, temperatura, espai lliure, nombre de processos...), etc... reunint tota aquesta informació en un punt centralitzat per tal de tenir una visió global sobre el funcionament dels diversos elements de la xarxa.
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The Top Speed of Flash Worms
Flash worms follow a precomputed spread tree using prior knowledge of all systems vulnerable to the worm’s exploit. In previous work we suggested that a flash worm could saturate one million vulnerable hosts on the Internet in under 30 seconds. We grossly over-estimated.
In this paper, we revisit the problem in the context of single packet UDP worms (inspired by Slammer and Witty). Simulating a flash version of Slammer, calibrated by current Internet latency measurements and observed worm packet delivery rates, we show that a worm could saturate 95% of one million vulnerable hosts on the Internet in 510 milliseconds. A similar worm using a TCP based service could 95% saturate in 1.3 seconds.
The speeds above are achieved with flat infection trees and packets sent at line rates. Such worms are vulnerable to recently proposed worm containment techniques. To avoid this, flash worms should slow down and use deeper, narrower trees. We explore the resilience of such spread trees when the list of vulnerable addresses is inaccurate. Finally, we explore the implications of flash worms for containment defenses: such defenses must correlate information from multiple sites in order to detect the worm, but the speed of the worm will defeat this correlation unless a certain fraction of traffic is artificially delayed in case it later proves to be a worm.
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© Copyright 2003-2006 Xavier Caballe.  . Si no s'indica expressament el contrari, el material publicat en aquest weblog es distribueix d'acord amb la llicència Creative Commons. El contingut és responsabilitat única i exclusivament del seu autor i no té cap relació amb les seves activitats professionals.
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